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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines leverage in European private equity led LBOs. We use a unique, self-
constructed sample of 126 European private equity (PE) sponsored buyouts completed 
between June 2000 and June 2007. We find that determinants derived from classical capital 
structure theories do not explain leverage in LBOs, while they do drive leverage in a control 
group of comparable public firms. Rather, we document that leverage levels in LBOs are 
related to the prevailing conditions in the debt market. In addition, our results indicate that 
reputed private equity sponsors use more debt and that secondary buyouts have higher 
leverage levels. 
 
JEL classification codes: G32 - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; 
Capital and Ownership Structure;  G24 - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage 
 
 
Keywords: leverage, capital structure, buyouts, LBO, financial flexibility   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The capital structure choice of firms is one of the most extensively researched fields 
in corporate finance. Yet, despite their massive economic importance and critical role in 
reallocating capital and revitalizing firms1, very little is known about the financing decision 
in the specific case of LBOs. Besides the fact that PE firms are relatively new players in the 
financial markets2, the main reason for this lack of information is the difficulty of collecting 
data regarding PE sponsored deals, especially in Europe. The central research objective of 
this paper is to provide evidence on what determines leverage levels in European private 
equity led LBOs. We examine how the typical European LBO deal is financed and whether 
this has changed over time. Next, we investigate to what extent classical capital structure 
determinants (firm size, collateral value of assets, profitability, growth potential and tax 
rates), debt market conditions (credit spread and leveraged loan spread) and LBO deal 
characteristics (type of buyout and reputation of the PE sponsor involved) explain cross-
sectional changes in buyout leverage levels. 
Studying and understanding LBO leverage is of critical importance as debt financing 
vastly affects the buyout firm’s financial flexibility. Also, empirical studies indicate that 
buyout firm leverage is a key driver of buyout value creation. In spite of the various potential 
benefits leverage in LBOs may offer, a major point of criticism is that the high levels of debt 
may be detrimental with respect to financial flexibility (Rappaport, 1990). Financial 
flexibility is valuable as it facilitates access to external financing in order to avoid financial 
distress in the face of unanticipated negative shocks or to readily finance investment when 
new profitable opportunities arise (Gamba and Triantis, 2008). Literature suggests that one 
of the most important drivers of firms’ capital structure decisions is exactly the desire to 
attain and preserve financial flexibility (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Pinegar and Wilbricht, 
1989; Graham and Harvey, 2001; Bancel and Mittoo, 2004; Brounen et al., 2004). DeAngelo 
                                               
 
1
 PE transactions accounted for as much as 16.5 percent ($782 billion) of worldwide M&A deal volume in the 
record year 2007 (Dealogic). 
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and DeAngelo (2007) even claim that financial flexibility is the critical missing link for an 
empirically viable capital structure theory. Leverage is predicted and empirically found to 
have a negative impact on corporate investment and future growth (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 
1990; Smith and Watts, 1992; Denis and Denis, 1993; Lang et al., 1996; Peyer and 
Shivdasani, 2001; Firth et al., 2008). This finding is significantly stronger among financially 
constrained firms (Ahn et al., 2006). Marchica and Mura (2007) confirm that a conservative 
leverage policy directed at maintaining financial flexibility enhances investment ability. 
Thus, given the high debt levels in LBOs and the major role of debt as a driver of financial 
flexibility, it is essential to thoroughly analyze LBO leverage.   
Besides its link with financial flexibility, LBO leverage also influences buyout 
returns. Kaplan and Stein (1993) confirm that the financing structure is significantly related 
to post-LBO performance. Guo et al. (2009) find that leverage is important in explaining 
realized returns. Returns to capital are greater when the LBO deal is financed with a greater 
proportion of bank loans. Kovner (2008) shows that the amount of leverage is an important 
source of value creation in buyouts.  
Our empirical research is performed using cross-section regression analysis on a 
unique, self-constructed dataset of LBOs, with a sample of comparable public firms 
servicing as a control group. The LBO dataset involves 126 European buyouts that have 
been completed between June 2000 and June 2007. We find that classical capital structure 
determinants do not explain leverage in LBOs, whereas they do for our control group of 
comparable public firms. Our empirical results confirm that LBOs have higher leverage 
when debt market liquidity is stronger. This suggests that PE firms may attract more debt 
when perceived financial flexibility is higher. We find that LBO debt levels are higher when 
a reputable PE sponsor is involved. Thus, reputed PE firms can create value by allowing 
their portfolio firms to take on more debt, which implies that, ceteris paribus, their LBO 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
2
 PE activity has increased enormously over the years. While the total value of firms acquired through 
leveraged buyouts (LBOs) between 1970 and 2007 has been estimated at about $3.6 trillion, $2.7 trillion of 
these transactions took place between 2001 and 2007 (World Economic Forum Private Equity Report, 2008). 
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firms benefit from a higher degree of financial flexibility. We also show that secondary 
buyouts are more highly levered.  
With this paper we intend to contribute to the nearly unexplored research area of the 
capital structure choice in European LBOs. Only two empirical studies about drivers of 
leverage levels in LBOs exist. Axelson et al. (2007) analyze the explanatory power of 
established capital structure theories and debt market liquidity on LBO leverage. Demiroglu 
and James (2007) study the effects of debt market conditions and PE sponsor reputation on 
LBO leverage. Besides providing new empirical evidence to this very thin body of research, 
we also extend existing research in several ways. First, we focus on Europe which is 
interesting as there are noticeable differences between US and European deals in particular3, 
and between the PE industry and financial markets in the US and Europe in general. 
Therefore, literature abstains from transferring findings from the US VC/PE industry one-to-
one to Europe due to a range of economic, legal, institutional and cultural differences 
(Sapienza et al., 1996; Jeng and Wells, 2000). Our sample consists of 126 European LBOs. 
Axelson et al. (2007) use a sample of 153 worldwide LBOs that contains European LBOs as 
well but they do not discuss whether results for US and European deals are similar. 
Demiroglu and James (2007) examine US public-to-privates (PTPs), which is a specific 
subsample of LBOs. PTPs are more levered than other deals (Axelson et al., 2007). Second, 
we use a representative sample of both primary and secondary deals sponsored by 58 buyout 
funds ranging in size, strategy and reputation. Axelson et al. (2007) only include the 5 
largest global buyout funds – as a result, their reputation variable will hardly show any 
variation and is therefore hard to test. Demiroglu and James (2007) provide evidence for the 
positive impact of PE fund reputation on leverage for US PTPs. Our study is the first that 
relates the PE sponsor’s reputation to LBO leverage for European LBOs. Third, as both 
studies referred to above find debt market conditions to play a significant role in explaining 
LBO leverage, this ‘debt market liquidity’ factor is examined more thoroughly by including 
two proxies for this determinant as opposed to one. Summarizing, the uniqueness of this 
                                               
 
3
 For instance, US deals rely more heavily on bonds than do European deals, and European bank debt consists 
of more tranches than US bank debt (Axelson et al., 2007). 
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study stems from its focus on European LBOs, its representative sample for the overall 
European LBO market and its inclusion of a very broad range of determinants of LBO 
leverage into one single study. Finally, this paper focuses on investigating the drivers of 
LBO leverage whereas the papers mentioned earlier study determinants of both leverage and 
pricing in buyouts.  
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our research methodology and 
sample. Empirical results are presented and discussed in Section 3, while Section 4 
concludes. 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Research setup 
This paper investigates capital structure choice in European buyouts. The first 
research subquestion analyzes what the typical LBO financing package looks like, by giving 
a detailed description of the capital structure at the time of the buyout of a LBO firm from 
the sample that is considered to be representative. 
 
I. How is a typical European buyout transaction financed? 
However, this picture is static. Prior empirical research suggests that the financing 
package chosen in LBOs changes over time (Kaplan and Stein, 1993; Altman, 2007; 
Demiroglu and James, 2007), as the markets for the various debt instruments typically 
included in the debt package evolve over time. In general, patterns of corporate financing 
decisions have changed over the years and it is therefore important to study these dynamics 
(Frank and Goyal, 2009). Therefore, the second research subquestion studies potential 
evolutions in the average LBO financing structure. We here expect to find that the financing 
package of LBOs develops over time from ‘senior bank debt only’ to a mix of senior bank 
debt and newer forms of debt financing, like mezzanine and second-lien debt.  
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II. Has the average financing package of LBOs changed over time? 
Next, we want to find out what actually drives the leverage choice in LBOs. It 
follows from empirical research that the leverage of ‘normal’ firms to a certain extent can be 
explained by established capital structure theories. Modigliani and Miller (1958) have shown 
that under perfect market conditions the capital structure is irrelevant to the value of the 
firm. When taxes are incorporated, this result changes (Modigliani and Miller, 1963). In later 
capital structure theories, other market imperfections are introduced. In the static trade-off 
theory, the optimal capital structure is determined by a trade-off between tax advantages of 
debt and the costs of financial distress. The pecking order theory states that firms follow a 
certain pecking order in which they prefer internal over external financing (Donaldson, 
1961; Myers, 1984). 
From these classical capital structure theories a number of firm characteristics can be 
derived that are empirically shown to influence firms’ financing choice (see for example 
Harris and Raviv, 1991; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Frank and Goyal, 2009). It is, however, 
not clear whether the same determinants that explain the capital structure choice in normal 
firms also drive the capital structure decision in buyouts. To find out whether classical 
capital structure theories play a role in the financing decision of LBOs, the capital structure 
choices of a sample of LBOs are compared to the capital structure choices of similar public 
firms not involved in an LBO. Comparing LBOs to public peers was previously done by 
Liebeskind et al. (1992) and Axelson et al. (2007). If both LBO sponsors and public peer 
firms make optimal financing choices based on the same theories the capital structures in 
LBO firms and their public peers should be positively correlated. This in turn means that the 
determinants of the capital structure of LBOs and public peers should also be related. 
Axelson et al. (2007) show that buyout leverage is mainly driven by other factors than what 
explains public firm leverage, while Demiroglu and James (2007) do find some support for 
the classical capital structure determinants. 
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III. Can existing capital structure theories explain leverage in LBOs? 
From a practitioner’s point of view, it is not the classical capital structure theories 
that explain leverage levels in buyouts, but it is more a matter of how much PE players can 
borrow - it is thought that PE sponsors borrow as much as they can. This idea has been 
formalized by Axelson et al. (2007). Support for this suggestion is found in the relatively 
new debt market timing theory, according to which firms take on more debt when interest 
rates are relatively low, as this indicates that the debt market is ‘overheated’ (Baker and 
Wurgler, 2002; Baker et al., 2003). Krishnaswami and Yaman (2007) confirm the 
importance of timing with respect to convertible bond issues. Hence for LBOs we expect 
that more leverage is used in times when debt is cheaper, i.e. when interest rates and credit 
spreads are low, which is empirically supported by Axelson et al. (2007) and Demiroglu and 
James (2007).4 Interest rates and credit spreads represent the availability of debt in the 
market, more formally referred to as debt market liquidity. We test whether debt market 
liquidity explains leverage levels in LBOs. 
 
IV. Can debt market conditions explain leverage in LBOs? 
Two additional variables that have come up in previous research are also tested: type 
of buyout deal (primary versus secondary deals) and the reputation of the PE player 
involved. Axelson et al. (2007) do not find differences in leverage between primary and 
secondary buyouts. Both Axelson et al. (2007) and Demiroglu and James (2007) confirm 
that PE firm reputation has a positive impact on the amount of leverage used. Recent 
literature has identified other variables, which are not considered in our study, that affect 
LBO leverage. Ivasina and Kovner (2008) document that LBO firm bank relationships affect 
the terms of their syndicated loans, i.e. they result in lower spreads and lighter covenants, 
and hence buyout leverage. Shivdasani and Wang (2009) show that supply-side factors like 
                                               
 
4
 Moreover, looser credit market conditions accelerate buyout funds’ investment activity and produce higher 
deal returns (Ljungqvist, Richardson and Wolfenzon, 2007). 
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the expansion of the market for CDOs led to cheaper credit, looser covenants and more 
aggressive use of bank loans in financing LBOs. 
 
V. Does buyout deal type or PE sponsor reputation explain leverage in LBOs? 
 
2.2 Specification of variables 
The first two research subquestions consider the financing package of LBOs. We 
gather detailed information on the various components of the financing packages of the 
LBOs in the sample. This financial information is then grouped into the equity or one of the 
debt categories. These debt categories are: senior debt (subdivided into Term loans A, B and 
C), junior debt (subdivided into mezzanine and second lien) and debt facilities (subdivided 
into revolving credit lines and capital expenditure facilities). The following two research 
subquestions involve the determinants of LBO capital structure. This section motivates our 
choice of the variables used in the regressions and discusses how they are measured. 
 
2.2.1 Dependent variable 
In the literature, the most widely employed proxy for firm leverage is its debt-to-
equity or debt-to-total-capital ratio. Practitioners, however, assess firm leverage by the ratio 
of debt to EBITDA (earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization), the 
EBITDA multiple. This multiple is commonly employed in practice when determining the 
debt package for LBOs as the amount of debt is largely based on the cash flow the firm can 
generate in order to support debt repayment. This makes the EBITDA multiple a direct and 
useful proxy of leverage for LBO practitioners. The debt to EBITDA measure for leverage is 
employed in earlier empirical research on LBO leverage (Axelson et al., 2007; Demiroglu 
and James, 2007). As this study specifically investigates determinants of LBO leverage, the 
EBITDA multiple is chosen as the primary proxy. Additionally, the debt-to-total-capital 
proxy is used as a control variable. The choice for this control variable is based on Frank and 
Goyal (2004), who discuss the various definitions of leverage and conclude that the most 
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appropriate measure is ‘total debt to market value of assets’. For the LBOs we indeed use 
this measure, while for the public peers we use book values due to data availability. 
 
2.2.2 Independent variables 
We aim at measuring the effect of various firm characteristics and macro-economic 
variables on firm leverage. With respect to the third research subquestion, various firm 
characteristics that play a role in classical capital structure theories are proxied. Here, our 
starting point is the determinants found by Rajan and Zingales (1995), Frank and Goyal 
(2004) and Frank and Goyal (2008) to explain leverage: firm size, collateral value of assets, 
growth opportunities and profitability. Next, also the corporate tax rate is included in our 
research as a possible determinant of capital structure, considering the supposedly important 
role of the tax shield in LBOs. Regarding the fourth research subquestion, two variables are 
employed to proxy the macroeconomic variable debt market liquidity, as insufficient prior 
research exists to be able to pin it down exactly. With the fifth research subquestion, two 
additional potential LBO leverage determinants come into play: the type of LBO deal and 
the reputation of the PE fund involved. 
 
Firm size 
Hypothesis IIIa: The larger the firm size, the higher its leverage. 
Large firms are expected to have lower expected pre-bankruptcy costs because they 
have more diversification possibilities as opposed to small firms. They are also thought to 
have lower information and transaction costs when issuing debt (Warner, 1977; Ang et al., 
1982). The static trade-off theory predicts that lower (pre-)bankruptcy costs are positively 
related to the use of debt financing, and so in turn firm size should have a positive effect on 
leverage. Various proxies are used for firm size. The most commonly used proxy for firm 
size is the natural logarithm of turnover (e.g. Titman and Wessels, 1988; Graham, 2000). 
Consequently, the natural logarithm of sales is chosen to proxy firm size. A positive feature 
of the natural logarithm is that it corrects for outliers. 
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Collateral value of assets 
Hypothesis IIIb: The higher the collateral value of a firm’s assets, the higher its 
leverage. 
The collateral value of a firm’s assets is considered as one of the drivers of the cost 
of debt. It determines the security that creditors have in case of default and therefore 
prevents agency problems between equity and debt holders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). It 
follows that firms can use more debt financing when they have more collateral. Fixed assets 
can serve as collateral. Thus, collateral value is proxied by the ratio of fixed to total assets. 
The expected positive relation between collateral and leverage has been supported in 
empirical research (Long and Malitz, 1985; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Frank and Goyal, 
2009). However, it should be noted that there also exist theoretical arguments for a negative 
relation between collateral and debt financing (Grossman and Hart, 1980, 1982). 
Considering the agency problems between shareholders and management, debt financing can 
be advantageous. Debt providers can influence management behavior, even to the extent of 
forcing the firm into liquidation (Harris and Raviv, 1990). But when these debt providers 
have collateral they may lose the incentive to exercise their power. Hence, the advantage of 
debt financing disappears when the collateral value of a firm’s assets is high, which implies 
a negative relation between collateral and debt financing. 
 
Growth potential 
Hypothesis IIIc: The larger the growth possibilities of a firm, the lower its leverage. 
A firm’s growth potential is assumed to be negatively related to its leverage, as firms 
fear that debt financing might limit the growth opportunities they have (Myers, 1977). Firms 
with high price-to-book (PTB) ratios are believed to have more (future) growth possibilities. 
Consequently, the PTB ratio (or market-to-book ratio) has been widely used in previous 
research as a measure of a firm’s growth opportunities (Adam and Goyal, 2008). We use this 
proxy as well. Firms with high PTB ratios face higher costs of financial distress and in turn, 
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as follows from the static trade-off theory, are expected to take on less debt. Empirical 
research has found a significant negative relation between a firm’s growth opportunities, 
proxied by the PTB ratio, and its leverage (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Frank and Goyal, 
2004). Demiroglu and James (2007) found a significant negative relation between growth 
prospects and the amount of leverage used in buyout financing. 
 
Tax rate 
Hypothesis IIId: The higher the corporate tax rate a firm faces, the higher its 
leverage. 
An expected positive relation between the corporate tax rate and the (relative) 
amount of debt follows directly from the static trade-off theory. To empirically assess this 
hypothesis, a measure for the marginal tax rate is needed. In prior research various proxies 
for the marginal tax rate are employed, among which the statutory tax rate. The statutory tax 
rate is the official tax rate a firm faces initially, before deductions. In most countries the 
statutory tax rates differ according to firm size. As all the ‘classical’ LBO leverage 
determinants so far are proxied by public peer characteristics, it fits, accordingly, to use the 
statutory tax rates for large firms. 
 
Profitability 
Hypothesis IIIe: The larger a firm’s profitability, the lower its leverage. 
The static trade-off theory implies that profitable firms take on relatively more debt 
financing, in order to compensate for taxes. However, this positive relation is not supported 
by empirical research findings. Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995), 
Fama and French (2002) and Frank and Goyal (2009) all report a negative correlation 
between profitability and debt financing, which supports the pecking order theory.  
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A negative relation between profitability and debt financing fits within the static 
trade-off perspective if adaptation costs related to making leverage adjustments are taken 
into account (Fischer et al., 1989). Firm profitability is proxied by return on assets (ROA). 
 
Debt market liquidity 
Hypothesis IV: The cheaper the debt, the higher the leverage that is taken on by 
(LBO) firms. 
The independent variables introduced so far are chosen in light of the classical capital 
structure theories and supported by substantial empirical evidence. With respect to the 
special case of LBO capital structure, a new variable, the liquidity in the debt market, is 
introduced into this spectrum of capital structure determinants. It follows from the market 
timing theory that the cost of borrowing might influence the amount of debt taken on by 
firms. This effect will be especially relevant in the case of LBOs, where debt financing plays 
an important role. It is suggested that when debt is cheaper, rational profit-seeking PE firms 
will take on more leverage. Therefore, debt market liquidity, a formalized manner of 
describing the ease of getting financing and the price that has to be paid for it, is expected to 
affect LBO leverage.  
Debt market liquidity can be proxied by the credit spread in the capital market. Credit 
spreads, besides compensating for credit risk, stem from the (il)liquidity in the market 
(Longstaff et al., 2005; Amato and Remolona, 2003). Also, credit spread is the proxy used 
by both Axelson et al. (2007) and Demiroglu and James (2007). Demiroglu and James 
(2007) measure credit spread by the spread between BB and AAA bond yields. We use the 
spread between BBB and AAA bond yields as a first proxy for debt market liquidity (credit 
spread). Axelson et al. (2007) define conditions in the debt market by ‘the local real interest 
rate (LIBOR) plus the leveraged loan spread’. The second part of this definition refers to a 
credit spread. Axelson et al. (2007) do not further specify how this is measured. The 
leveraged loan spread represents the spread in the leveraged loan market, which is the 
market for syndicated bank loans (Miller, 2006). Data on leveraged loan spreads are 
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obtained from Standard & Poor’s Leveraged Loan Review. We include leveraged loan 
spread as a second proxy for debt market liquidity. 
  
Primary versus secondary deals 
Hypothesis Va: Leverage levels are higher in primary buyouts than in secondary 
buyouts.  
LBO deals can be subdivided into primary and secondary deals, where secondary 
buyouts are former LBO firms that are bought out by another private equity firm5. 
Practitioners claim that leverage levels in secondary deals are on average higher. One reason 
is that the first PE sponsor has already realized much of the organizational and operational 
restructuring potential and therefore the second PE firm must resort to maximal leverage in 
order to make profit. A second reason could be that the LBO firm is now financially much 
stronger and showing better operating performance, which allows higher leverage when the 
first PE firm exits than when it invested in the firm. 
 
Private equity party reputation 
Hypothesis Vb: The higher the reputation of the private equity party involved, the 
higher the leverage levels in LBOs.  
Cotter and Peck (2001) were the first to empirically underline the important role of 
PE funds (referred to as “buyout specialists”) in buyouts. Their view was supported and 
extended by others, e.g. Kaplan and Schoar (2005), who find that larger and more 
experienced venture capital funds perform better on both the short and the long term. Hence, 
reputation may reflect a PE firm’s skills in selecting and monitoring firms. Lenders may 
rationally view borrowing to LBO firms sponsored by reputable PE sponsors as less risky. 
Furthermore, as argued by Diamond (1989), PE firm reputation reduces the need for bank 
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monitoring in order to limit moral hazard and thus allows for more bank debt. Demiroglu 
and James (2007) more specifically address the relationship between PE sponsor reputation 
and LBO financing. They find that differences in buyout leverage are related to the 
reputation of the PE fund involved.  
Demiroglu and James (2007) measure PE fund reputation by the number of all SDC-
recorded public-to-private and private-to-private buyout transactions that the fund invested 
in during the prior three years. In other words, they define fund reputation by fund activity. 
In this study, a comparable proxy is used, as PE fund reputation is defined by fund size, 
measured by funds raised for direct investment. PE fund sizes are obtained from the 2007 PE 
ranking published by Private Equity International Magazine, an international magazine for 
the global PE and venture capital industry. This magazine was the first to rank PE firms by 
size using a consistent methodology, listing them by the amount of capital raised for direct 
investment over the past five years. The ranking covers a very large part of the PE market; 
the 50 largest funds included accounted for 75 percent of global PE deal activity since 2002 
(see Appendix 1). 
 
2.3 The dataset 
For the empirical research, a unique, self-constructed dataset is employed. This 
dataset encompasses detailed information on a large number of mid-market European LBO 
deals and matching public peers. Data collection with respect to European buyouts was not 
an easy task, as in Europe most information on LBOs is kept private. Thanks to access to 
private files from merchant bank X6, involving PE-backed LBO deals in which X acted as a 
lender, information could be collected on 126 buyout transactions. This subsection first 
describes the process of data collection. Next, it addresses the issue of whether the LBO data 
is representative for the European LBO market, as a set of deals in which X was a lender is 
used as a starting point in the data collection process. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
5
 Leveraged buyouts of a higher order than secondary buyouts (tertiary buyouts and higher numbers) are not 
included in this research. 
  
17
2.3.1 Data collection 
LBO data 
For the 126 buyout transactions found in X’s documentation, information was 
collected regarding deal date, deal location, type of LBO deal (primary or secondary), 
industry (SIC code), PE sponsor involved and the LBO financing package. Most of this 
information comes from the deal documentation of X. The missing information was 
completed using the Dealscan and Dealogic databases, company websites of both PE firms 
and target firms and online published press releases regarding the deals7. In some cases non-
Euro currencies were reported. These were recalculated into Euros using historical exchange 
rates. With respect to the capital structures, the initially obtained information on debt 
instruments used was so broadly categorized that debt structures were reclassified into the 
three main debt categories: senior debt, second-lien and mezzanine.  
Table 1 provides an overview of our research sample of 126 LBOs with respect to 
locations and deal dates. The LBO dataset obtained covers a time period of seven years, 
from June 2000 until June 2007. The deals are not equally spread over time but biased 
towards the more recent years. Two explanations for this are that, first, the LBO market has 
become more developed in recent years, and second, that data files at X are destroyed after 
five years unless there is still some activity regarding a deal within these five years, for 
example because of a recapitalization.8 The majority of deals took place in the UK, 
Germany, the Netherlands or France.  
The analysis of the details of the LBO financing packages (research questions I and 
II) is based on 123 LBOs; three deals were excluded from the initial dataset because for 
these deals the details on the financing package were not available or incomplete. The 
analysis of the determinants of the capital structure of LBOs (research questions III, IV and 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
6
 X is a merchant bank active in the mid-market segment in North-Western Europe. For confidentiality reasons, 
its name is not disclosed. 
7
 Press releases on PE deals were found on the website of AltAssets: http://www.altassets.net. 
8
 The latter explanation may potentially lead to a selection problem. In order to rule this out, we have 
performed our analyses as well for the 2003-2007 subsample. Results remain qualitatively similar. 
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V) is based on 118 LBOs; eight deals were excluded because no leverage measures could be 
found. 
Insert Table 1 About Here 
Public peer data 
The second step in the construction of our dataset is to match the LBO firms to 
comparable public firms. Using Thomson One Banker, these public peers are found by 
searching for active public companies from the same country and with the same industry 
classification code (SIC code). Harris and Raviv (1991) show that firms within the same 
industry class have and hold on to specific relative leverage levels over time. Various 
industry-specific leverage levels have been documented by Bradley et al. (1984), Long and 
Malitz (1985) and Kester (1986). Using only the country and industry criteria, sometimes 
multiple peers result from the search. In these cases, also company size is taken into account, 
in order to limit the public peer group to a maximum of three peers. Firm characteristics and 
financial information of these public peers are obtained from Thomson One Banker. We 
include firm characteristics of public peers as this info is unavailable for our set of LBO 
firms due to their private nature. 
 
Debt market liquidity 
The third step in the sample construction is to collect data on debt market liquidity. 
The credit spread is measured by the quarterly spread between BBB and AAA bond yields. 
Quarterly data on leveraged loan spreads (over Euribor) is obtained from Standard & Poor's 
European Leveraged Loan Review. 
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2.3.2 Representativity of the dataset and potential biases 
The fact that X is the starting point for the data collection might affect the sample’s 
representativity for the European LBO market. X is a merchant bank in the mid-market 
segment in North-Western Europe. This means that the LBO transactions in the dataset 
involve medium-sized European LBO deals and the majority of deals take place in North-
Western Europe. When comparing the sample with respect to these features to Standard & 
Poor’s statistics on the overall European buyout market (Standard & Poor’s LCD European 
Leveraged Buyout Review 4Q 2007, January 2008), it can be concluded that the sample is  
representative for the overall European LBO market, as in both the sample and the overall 
European LBO market there is a bias towards the North-Western European countries. 
Furthermore, the average sample deal sizes closely resemble the average deal sizes of overall 
European initial and secondary buyouts. 
X is involved as a lender in all of the buyouts, mostly as a participant with another 
bank as the lead arranger, but also as the lead arranger. Following Sufi (2007), there are 
three differences between deals in which the bank is a lead arranger and deals in which the 
bank is a participant lender. First, the lead arranger establishes and maintains the relationship 
with the borrower while the participant lender has an “arm’s-length” relation with the 
borrower (via the lead arranger). Second, lead arrangers typically hold a larger share of the 
loan, and thirdly, lead arrangers have more negotiation rights. As these differences are all of 
administrative nature, it seems unlikely that the inclusion in the sample of deals in which X 
has a lead arranger role would create a bias towards X’s financing choices. Nevertheless, a 
possible bias towards X’s financing choices in the lead arranger deals is examined by 
introducing a dummy for the lender role of X into the regression analysis (see Table 
Appendix 2). It follows that the lender role of X does not affect our outcomes.  
Finally, as 58 different lead PE sponsors are involved in the sample of 126 buyouts, a 
potential bias towards the LBO financing choices of a limited range of PE funds can be ruled 
out. Thus, our sample is not only diverse with respect to the set of PE firms involved, but 
also with respect to the size of these funds. This as opposed to Axelson et al. (2007), whose 
sample consists of deals sponsored by the five largest buyout sponsors only. 
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3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This section deals with the research questions empirically and presents the outcomes. 
Subsection 3.1 addresses research questions I and II, by analyzing the typical financial 
structure of European LBO transactions and by mapping developments in the financing of 
European buyouts over time, respectively. Research questions III and IV are discussed in 
subsection 3.2, where regression analysis is employed to find out whether classical capital 
structure theories and/or debt market liquidity determine leverage levels in LBOs. 
Subsection 3.3 tackles research question V. To this end, it is tested if the size of the PE 
sponsor involved or the type of buyout possibly influence LBO leverage. 
 
3.1 The financial structure of LBOs 
The financial structure that PE firms choose for their target firms is different from the 
financial structure employed by public firms. More specifically, research suggests that the 
financial structure of buyouts typically consists of 60-80% of debt, as opposed to debt ratios 
of 20-30% in public firms (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Besides the quantity of debt used, 
also debt structures are investigated. Subsection 3.1.1 provides insight into the typical 
financial structure of buyouts and subsection 3.1.2 analyzes the typical financial structure 
over time. 
 
3.1.1 The typical financial structure of European buyouts 
This subsection aims at presenting a more detailed understanding of what the 
financing package of a typical European LBO actually looks like, which is important 
considering the complicated nature of LBO financing. To this end, an in-depth description of 
the financial structure of a typical European buyout transaction that is representative for the 
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European buyout market with respect to its financing characteristics is provided9. In Table 2 
the financial structure of the buyout is presented. 
 
Insert Table 2 About Here 
The total buyout deal value amounted to €1230m, which was financed by €435m of 
equity and €795m of debt. In other words, the financial structure of this buyout consisted of 
35% equity and 65% debt, which is close to the average of our sample. The equity part 
consisted of three categories: management equity, instant equity and subordinated loan 
stock. What is more interesting about the financial structure in buyouts is the variety of types 
of debt that are used. The senior debt makes up for most of the debt (64%). Also, a 
substantial tranche of mezzanine debt was attracted. Mezzanine was divided into two equal 
tranches, one with warrants and the other without, both appealing to different types of 
investors in the European mezzanine market. Another popular type of debt used in LBOs, 
second-lien debt, was not used in this transaction. It should be noted here that second-lien 
debt typically started to appear in buyout financing in 2004 (Standard & Poor’s, LCD 
European Leveraged Buyout Review 4Q 2007, January 2008) and our example LBO deal 
took place in 2003. In addition to the senior and junior debt, two types of debt facilities were 
attracted: a revolving credit facility and a CAPEX/acquisition facility. 
When practitioners talk about buyout deals, they use EBITDA multiples, as this 
relates debt financing to the firm’s ability to repay debt. In the case of the example deal, the 
main characteristics of the deal in practitioners’ terms are that the (total) debt multiple is 5.3 
and the enterprise value multiple is 8.2. Very high multiples are considered to describe so-
called ‘aggressive’ financing (referring to high debt combined with low company income) 
and low multiples are often regarded as a sign of undervaluation. What is high and what is 
low is not that straightforward, but depends on many factors, like the size of the buyout, the 
                                               
 
9
 Due to disclosure regulations, the name of the buyout target and PE firm involved cannot be revealed. 
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country where the buyout takes place, the target’s industry and the time at which the buyout 
occurs. Overall, average buyout multiples are significantly higher in the US than in Europe, 
stable industries are financed with higher multiples than cyclical industries, larger buyouts 
are financed with higher multiples than buyouts with a smaller deal size and average 
multiples vary according to the state of the buyout market. The average debt multiple in 
2003 for European buyouts was 4.4 (European Leveraged Loan Review, August 2007), so it 
can be concluded that the financing of the example LBO deal is quite aggressive for that 
time. The average 2006 debt multiple for European buyouts was 6.3. 
Axelson et al. (2007) also present an example of the capital structure of a typical 
buyout, which has 25% of equity financing and is equal to their sample average. This is well 
below the mean of our sample. The variety of types of debt used is similar. It should be 
noted that their example of a typical buyout involves a secondary deal, which we found to 
take on more debt.  
 
3.1.2 Developments in buyout financing 
This subsection gives a more general overview of the financial structure of the LBOs 
in the sample and addresses changes in the average financing package over time. As such, 
our study pioneers in providing a detailed overview of the composition and evolution of the 
financing package of European LBOs.  
Axelson et al. (2007) were the first to collect a large dataset (153 LBOs) of US and 
European LBOs and their financing characteristics. In their investigation of LBO debt 
structure, they differentiate between European and US buyouts but they do not take the 
differences in transaction dates (which range between 1985 and 2006) into account. Average 
LBO leverage levels vary over time, implying that the composition of the LBO debt 
structure is subject to change according to time. Therefore, an overview of the average LBO 
debt structure based on the whole sample is of limited value. We incorporate a time factor by 
differentiating according to the year in which the buyout was completed.  
The analysis can broadly be divided into two parts. In the first part the use of debt in 
the sample is discussed in a more general sense, after which, in the second part, a detailed 
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analysis of the various components of the LBO capital structure is given. Next to describing 
the composition of buyout capital structure, also changes in the average LBO financing 
structure are examined, by comparing the buyouts completed in the 2000 to 2003 period to 
buyouts completed in the 2004 to 2007 period10. To this end, unpaired t-tests are performed, 
testing the null hypothesis that the averages of the two groups are equal.  
Table 3 provides an overview of the overall use of debt in the sample, describing 
how much debt (as a percentage of total capital) has been used in the financing of LBOs over 
the years and what categories this debt consisted of. Both mean and median values are 
provided. Considering the relatively small sample size, the median values are expected to be 
more reliable than the means. The use of debt in buyout financing slightly increased over 
time, from about 68 to 71 percent of total capital. However, this increase is not significant. 
The low availability of data on this variable for the years 2000 to 2002 could play a role 
here. As for the debt categories, throughout the years senior debt has always taken up the 
largest part of debt financing, amounting to about 61 to 79 percent of total debt. Senior debt 
financing remained very popular and has slightly (insignificantly) increased. Junior debt 
takes up about 15 to 18 percent of total debt, but there seems to be no clear upward or 
downward trend over the years. Most buyouts (85 percent) make use of debt facilities, but 
the overview shows a decline (although not significant) in the amount of debt facilities from 
about 15 percent in the 2000 to 2003 period to about 5 to 7 percent in 2007. Debt to 
EBITDA levels have risen significantly, from a mean of 4.53 to 5.35.  
Insert Table 3 About Here 
While most of the above changes are not significant, taking a closer look at the trends 
in LBO financing structure confirms significant evolutions within these categories. Table 4 
provides an overview by year of the mean and median values of the different types of debt 
                                               
 
10
 The choice of these two groups can be motivated as follows. First, it cuts the data sample in half with respect 
to years. Second, 2004 to 2007 was a period of sharp growth in the buyout market, as opposed to the relatively 
calm and steady buyout market in 2000 to 2003. 
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instruments used. There has been a significant decline in the use of Term A loans in 
combination with significant increases in the use of Term loans B and C. This could be 
explained by the difference between Term A loans versus Term B and C loans. In the 
syndicated loan market, Term A loans are sold to (commercial) banks, while Term B and C 
loans are sold to institutional investors (Miller, 2006). The exhibited trend therefore 
represents an increased popularity of the institutional debt market. The analysis in Table 3 
gave an inconclusive outcome with respect to the development of the junior debt category. 
As shown in Table 4, this is the result of the opposing trends of the two types of debt within 
this category. While the use of mezzanine financing decreased slightly over the years, a new 
type of junior debt, second lien debt, entered the European market from 2004 onwards (see 
Standard & Poor’s LCD European Leveraged Buyout Review 4Q 2007). Second lien debt 
use increased from 0 percent in the 2000 to 2003 period up to about 8 percent in 2007. The 
first second-lien debt used in the data sample was for a buyout deal completed in September 
2004. Finally, the decreasing trend with respect to the category of debt facilities can be 
explained by a significant decline in the amounts of revolving credit facilities employed. 
Our results can be extended to explain the developments in the European LBO 
market in general, as we have verified that our dataset adequately reflects the European 
buyout market, by comparing the yearly debt structure composition of our dataset to that of 
the European buyout market, as recorded by Standard & Poor’s (Standard&Poor’s LCD 
European Leveraged Buyout Review). Both groups exhibit an almost identical composition 
of LBO debt structure throughout the years. 
Our outcomes are in line with Demiroglu and James (2007). Their sample of US 
PTPs has a somewhat lower average equity percentage of 30-35% but the composition of 
debt shows similar evolutions: traditional bank debt, revolving credit lines and Term A loans 
became less popular over time, whereas second lien debt and Term B loans were being used 
more frequently.   
 
Insert Table 4 About Here 
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3.2 Determinants of LBO leverage 
In this section research questions III and IV are addressed. We first test for potential 
multicollinearity problems. The correlation matrix in Table 5 shows that our regressors are 
not highly correlated. This is confirmed by an analysis of unreported VIF inflation factors. 
Table 6 presents the descriptive statistics for all regression variables. The average LBO firm 
in our sample has sales of 456 mio euro, a price-to-book ratio of 4.08 and a return on assets 
of 9.55%. It has on average 28.41% of fixed assets, a tax rate of 29.95%, a credit spread of 
0.81% and a leveraged loan spread of 2.83%. The mean debt to assets ratio is 70% for our 
sample of LBO firms and 29% for our control sample of public companies. The average debt 
level corresponds to a Debt/EBITDA multiple of 5.22 for LBO firms and 1.33 for the control 
group of listed firms.  
Insert Table 5 & 6 here 
 
3.2.1 Comparison of leverage levels 
If the capital structure choice for LBOs is comparable to that of public firms, it 
follows that leverage levels of LBO firms and matched public firms should be positively 
related. This can easily be tested by regressing LBO leverage on public peer leverage, as is 
done by both Axelson et al. (2007) and Demiroglu and James (2007). However, both 
empirical studies do not find a significant relationship. The evidence presented in Table 7 
confirms these findings. For all leverage measures (Debt/EBITDA, Ln Debt/EBITDA, 
Debt/Capital)11 there is no significant relation between the leverage levels of LBOs and their 
public peers. Moreover, regressing LBO leverage on public peer leverage produces very 
weak regression models. 
                                               
 
11
 As a robustness check, we also performed all regression analyses of this section and the next sections using 
Senior Debt/EBITDA, Ln Senior Debt/EBITDA and Senior Debt/Capital. Using these alternative leverage 
measures does not influence our findings. 
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A possible explanation for not finding a significant relationship is that leverage 
choices made at the moment of completion of the buyout transaction concern temporary 
leverage levels, as opposed to the steady long-term leverage levels chosen by public firms 
(Demiroglu and James, 2007). However, this possibility has been thoroughly examined by 
Axelson et al. (2007). No relation was found between planned future LBO leverage and 
matched public firm leverage or between LBO leverage and the leverage of ‘up-to-date’ 
public peers, i.e. public peers that recently adjusted their leverage. An alternative 
explanation for this outcome is that capital structure decisions of LBOs and public peers are 
based on different motivations. This possibility is addressed in the following subsections.  
Insert Table 7 About Here 
3.2.2 The classical capital structure theories and LBO leverage 
To test whether the classical capital structure theories hold for public firms and LBO 
firms alike, we regress both LBO leverage and public peer leverage on a set of classical 
leverage determinants. The research process can be divided into two parts. First, we perform 
a regression analysis regarding the control group of public peers to check whether the 
selected variables adequately explain leverage. Next, we regress LBO leverage on the same 
leverage determinants. The regression results regarding the control group of public peers are 
summarized in Table 8. It can be concluded that the classical capital structure determinants 
indeed have explanatory power with respect to leverage levels in public firms. Firm size, 
profitability, growth potential and collateral asset value all have a significant effect on firm 
leverage. Best results are obtained when leverage is measured by the (Ln) debt to EBITDA 
multiple. Only the tax rate does not appear to be of significant influence, regardless of the 
leverage measure chosen. This could be explained by the fact that our proxy for the tax rate, 
the statutory corporate tax rate, might substantially differ from the actual corporate tax rate 
which firms face. The signs of the coefficients are all but one in line with our hypotheses. 
The expected positive relation between firm size and leverage is not confirmed by the 
regression results. Instead, a (significant) negative relation is found.  
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Insert Table 8 About Here 
Table 9 presents the regression results on LBO leverage and the same classical 
capital structure determinants. Regression outcomes are presented with respect to all three 
leverage measures. For the third regression analysis, where leverage is proxied by debt to 
total assets, the model as a whole is not significant. The other two regression models are also 
not very strong, especially not when compared to the public peer regression models. As for 
the various classical capital structure determinants, none of the variables that exhibited a 
significant effect on the public peers is significant for the LBOs. Only the corporate tax rate, 
which did not have any explanatory power in the public peer group, emerges as a significant 
determinant of LBO leverage. However, a negative instead of the anticipated positive 
relation between tax and leverage is found. We conclude that leverage in LBOs cannot be 
explained by the same variables as leverage in comparable public firms. 
Insert Table 9 About Here 
3.2.3 Debt market liquidity and LBO leverage 
Our results show that average debt multiple levels in LBOs change over time. This 
implies that there might be a time related factor that influences the leverage choice. In line 
with this, practitioners claim that leverage is driven by debt market liquidity. This idea is 
formalized in the fourth research sub question. The related hypothesis is that cheaper debt, 
which is translated into lower credit spreads and lower leveraged loan spreads, corresponds 
to higher debt levels. While this liquidity effect is thought to play a role in all types of firms, 
it is expected to be strongest in the case of LBOs given the important role of debt financing 
in LBOs.  
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First, this liquidity effect is tested with respect to the public peer group. To this end, 
the debt market liquidity measures are entered into the regression model of the previous 
subsection (see Table 10). The influence of the classical firm characteristics on leverage 
largely remains the same. However, the outcomes do not support the debt market liquidity 
hypothesis. The leveraged loan spread has no significant effect on leverage and the 
coefficient for the credit spread has a significantly positive coefficient, which is in contrast 
to expectations. For instance, Graham and Harvey (2001) indicate that executives view the 
level of interest rates as a critical factor in their capital structure decisions. 
 
Insert Table 10 About Here 
Next, the explanatory power of the debt market conditions is tested with respect to 
leverage in LBOs. We add proxies for debt market conditions to the classical regression 
model in Table 11. Again, the inclusion of debt market conditions does not alter the 
previously documented non-significant influence of the classical capital structure 
determinants on LBO leverage. However, we provide support for the debt market liquidity 
hypothesis, as the leveraged loan spread shows a very significant negative relationship to 
LBO leverage. The credit spread is insignificant. We confirm that capital structure choice in 
LBOs is affected by prevailing debt market conditions. 
 
Insert Table 11 About Here 
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3.2.4 LBO deal type/PE sponsor reputation and LBO leverage 
As formalized in our fifth research question, this section studies whether two more 
factors have any explanatory power for the capital structure choice in LBOs: the type of deal 
(primary versus secondary) and the reputation of the PE player involved. 
 
Primary versus secondary deals 
In Table 12, we enter a dummy for the type of deal (primary versus secondary) into 
the regression analysis. We find that leverage levels are significantly higher for secondary 
deals, whereas Axelson et al. (2007) find no differences between primary and secondary 
deals.  
 
Insert Table 12 About Here 
Private equity party reputation 
In order to test whether PE reputation influences LBO leverage, our sample is 
divided into groups based on the size of the (lead) PE fund involved. Dummies are entered 
into the regression analysis accordingly. The sample is split in one group of LBOs led by a 
top-50 size (large) PE fund and another group of LBOs not led by a top-50 size (small) fund. 
Table 13 presents the results. LBO leverage is significantly higher in deals sponsored by the 
top-50 size PE funds. Consequently, more reputable PE sponsors can attract more leverage 
for their LBO deals.  
 
Insert Table 13 About Here 
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4. CONCLUSION 
4.1 Discussion  
LBOs are characterized by their intensive use of debt financing. High leverage is 
crucial because of the limited equity PE funds invest, but theory suggests that debt financing 
also serves many other roles, like its disciplinary role for the target firm and its role as a tax 
shield. On the other hand, debt involves disadvantages, like increased bankruptcy costs and 
reduced financial flexibility. The established capital structure theories claim that these and 
other factors drive the financing choice in LBOs. However, practitioners think differently 
about what drives the leverage levels in LBOs. They believe that LBO leverage is driven by 
the prevailing liquidity in the debt market. 
To find out what truly drives leverage in LBOs, we have collected a unique research 
sample of 126 European PE sponsored buyouts completed between June 2000 and June 
2007. We have analysed the capital structure details of these LBOs. On average, 71 percent 
of buyout financing consists of debt. Over time, this percentage has increased insignificantly. 
Within this debt package, changes have taken place with respect to the debt instruments 
used. Regarding senior debt financing, the importance of Term loan A has diminished in 
favour of Term loans B and C, implying a trend towards the institutional debt market. 
Regarding junior debt financing, the use of mezzanine financing decreased slightly over the 
years, while a new type of junior debt, second lien debt, entered the European market from 
2004 onwards. 
Next, we examine the explanatory power of a broad range of variables with respect to 
European LBO leverage. We find that determinants derived from the classical capital 
structure theories cannot explain leverage in LBOs, while they do so significantly in the case 
of a set of comparable public firms. On the other hand, debt market conditions do not impact 
public peer leverage, but they are significantly related to LBO leverage. Thus, as suggested 
by practitioners, the capital structure choice with respect to LBOs is heavily influenced by 
the prevailing conditions in the debt market. When credit conditions loosen, LBOs use 
relatively more debt, suggesting that PE firms may attract more debt when perceived 
financial flexibility is higher. We also find that the involvement of a reputable PE fund in a 
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buyout results on average in higher leverage levels. Reputed PE sponsors are more capable 
of obtaining high leverage for their target firms. They can create value by providing their 
portfolio firms with more financial flexibility which allows to take on more debt. Secondary 
LBOs also show higher leverage levels. Our results for determinants of capital structure in 
European LBOs are largely in line with (US) findings of Axelson et al. (2007) and 
Demiroglu and James (2007). 
 
4.2 Limitations and avenues for further research 
A first limitation arises from the research sample used. The collected data comes 
from LBO deals in which merchant bank X was involved. A possible solution to this bias 
would be to collect a larger data sample stemming from multiple and independent data 
sources. Yet, we feel that any potential bias would have a limited impact on our results. 
First, our dataset is representative for the European LBO market according to S&P`s 
statistics. Second, 58 different PE players are involved in our LBO deals, which makes it 
unlikely that X’s involvement in a deal would affect leverage levels. Third, we find no 
difference between deals where X was a lead or non-lead lender. Another way to improve 
our study would be to enlarge our sample size and to include pre-LBO financials of the 
buyout firms for classical capital structure theory variables instead of proxying them by 
matched public firm financials. However, information on pre-LBO financials is notoriously 
hard to find. These limitations open up many potential avenues for further research. 
Another bias may arise from the natural market developments that could not all be 
taken into account. As is claimed in the 2007 Special Issue on Private Equity of the Journal 
of Applied Corporate Finance, innovations in the market, such as activities of PE funds and 
the innovation of the credit risk mitigation techniques, have reduced the costs of 
reorganizing companies. This makes leverage ratios increase and costs of borrowing 
decrease (Altman, 2007). It also leads to the question if there is another factor at work 
behind debt market liquidity. What makes debt market liquidity vary so much over time? 
Next, one particular outcome of this paper is fascinating: when debt becomes cheaper, why 
do public firms not react like PE firms and increase their leverage?  
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These issues call for further analysis. Finally, it would be very interesting to 
empirically study whether the extensive amount of debt used in LBOs reduces financial 
flexibility. If so, it would be worthwhile to investigate to what extent this is the case and how 
PE sponsors deal with this.   
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TABLE 1 
Overview of locations and deal dates of LBO research sample 
This table presents an overview of the locations (by country) and the deal dates (by year) of the research 
sample of leveraged buyouts. The year 2007 concerns the first half of the year as the dataset only includes deals 
until June 2007. 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 
UK 1 4 2 2 6 6 11 1 33 
Germany 2 1 3 3 8 9 6 2 34 
France 2 2 3  2 2 4  15 
Netherlands  1 1 3 4 7 6  22 
Belgium    2 2  1  5 
Denmark    2   2  4 
Sweden     1 1 1 1 4 
Ireland     1  1  2 
Switzerland       1  1 
Finland       1  1 
Norway       1  1 
Spain       1  1 
Italy        2 2 
Austria        1 1 
Total 5 8 9 12 24 25 36 7 126 
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TABLE 2 
The financing structure of a typical LBO 
This table presents the details on the financing structure of a typical leveraged buyout deal. The first column 
presents the details of the financial structure on which the table reports. The second column reports the amounts 
in million Euros. The third column reports the enterprise value multiple, the equity multiple, the total debt 
multiple and the senior debt multiple, respectively. The fourth column provides information on the repayment 
terms of the debt. The fifth column reports information on the pricing of the debt. The abbreviation bp stands 
for basis points (over Euribor). Sources: X’s deal documentation and own calculations. 
 Amount 
(million €) 
EBITDA 
multiple 
Repayment 
term (in years) 
Pricing (spread over 
Euribor) 
 
    
Enterprise Value 1225 8.2   
 
    
Total Equity 430 2.9   
 
(=35%)    
 
    
Management equity 2.5    
Instant equity 2.5    
Subordinated loan stock 425    
 
    
Total Debt 795 5.3   
 
(=65%)    
 
    
Total Senior Debt 510 3.4   
Term Loan A 250  7 225bp 
Term Loan B 130  8 275bp 
Term Loan C 130  9 325bp 
2nd Lien 0    
Mezzanine 165   Two tranches 
Total debt facilities 120    
Revolving credit facility 50  7 225bp 
Capex/Acquisition facility 70  7 225bp 
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TABLE 3 
Developments in buyout financing, broad statistics 
This table presents broad statistics on the capital structure of the sample of 123 European buyouts, which were 
completed between June 2000 and June 2007. The first eight rows report means and medians by year for a 
range of leverage ratios that are specified in the columns. The following two rows report the averages for the 
first four years and the last four years, respectively. In the last two rows the value of the various leverage ratios 
between two time periods are compared; the direction of the time trend is reported (by + and – signs) and the p-
value of the t-test statistic (unpaired t-test) for the significance of the time trend is reported. *,** and *** 
indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
  Total Debt to 
Capital 
Senior Debt to Junior Debt to Debt Facilities to Debt to EBITDA 
Year Total Debt Total Debt Total Debt   
  
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
2000 - - 70.59% 73.07% 16.29% 7.48% 13.12% 13.65% 3.86 4.00 
2001 - - 71.29% 66.71% 16.18% 16.47% 12.54% 11.95% 5.25 5.50 
2002 - - 62.89% 61.67% 16.70% 19.18% 20.41% 20.00% 4.38 4.79 
2003 67.85% 68.00% 71.58% 72.25% 12.60% 16.88% 15.82% 14.87% 4.62 4.61 
2004 71.44% 71.17% 69.98% 69.32% 15.30% 17.50% 14.71% 12.97% 4.51 4.30 
2005 70.59% 70.91% 75.80% 73.31% 14.39% 17.87% 9.81% 8.91% 5.08 5.10 
2006 69.51% 71.24% 66.75% 66.67% 16.87% 17.55% 16.38% 14.63% 6.07 5.78 
2007 71.97% 71.43% 75.74% 79.11% 16.76% 20.00% 7.50% 5.75% 5.75 5.80 
  
          
AVG  
'00-'03 67.85% 68.00% 68.21% 68.42% 16.14% 15.00% 15.66% 15.12% 4.53 4.72 
AVG  
'04-'07 70.88% 71.19% 72.07% 72.10% 15.83% 18.23% 12.10% 10.57% 5.35 5.24 
  
          
Time 
trend  
(+) (+) (+/-) (-) (+)*** 
0.005 
2000-2003 
vs.  
2004-2007 
p-value 0.587 0.489 0.883 0.551 
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Table 4: Developments in buyout financing, detailed statistics 
This table presents broad statistics on the capital structure of the sample of 123 European buyouts, which were completed between June 2000 and June 
2007. The first eight rows report means and medians by year for a range of leverage ratios that are specified in the columns. The following two rows report 
the averages for the first four years and the last four years, respectively. In the final two rows the value of the various leverage ratios between two time 
periods are compared; the direction of the time trend is reported (by + and – signs) and the p-values of the t-test statistics (unpaired t-test) for the 
significance of the time trend are reported. *,** and *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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 Year 
Term Loan A to 
Total Debt 
Term Loan B to 
Total Debt 
Term Loan C to 
Total Debt 
Mezzanine to 
Total Debt 
Second Lien to 
Total Debt 
RCF to Total 
Debt 
Capex to Total 
Debt 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
2000 48.36% 48.63% 18.95% 22.02% 3.27% 0.00% 16.29% 7.48% 0.00% 0.00% 13.12% 13.65% 0.00% 0.00% 
2001 46.04% 46.39% 18.38% 17.16% 6.87% 1.58% 16.18% 16.47% 0.00% 0.00% 12.54% 11.95% 0.00% 0.00% 
2002 30.39% 29.81% 17.21% 17.55% 15.29% 16.67% 16.70% 19.18% 0.00% 0.00% 17.27% 13.70% 3.14% 0.00% 
2003 36.70% 35.05% 17.73% 16.91% 17.15% 16.38% 12.60% 16.88% 0.00% 0.00% 12.79% 13.85% 3.03% 0.00% 
2004 33.73% 34.66% 19.23% 17.86% 17.03% 17.10% 14.44% 15.80% 0.86% 0.00% 9.86% 10.69% 4.85% 0.00% 
2005 30.62% 28.57% 25.94% 23.92% 19.24% 21.20% 11.12% 14.46% 3.27% 0.00% 8.08% 7.13% 1.73% 0.00% 
2006 23.68% 21.16% 23.68% 22.92% 19.39% 20.96% 13.51% 15.46% 3.35% 0.00% 12.25% 7.11% 4.13% 0.00% 
2007 17.37% 18.38% 28.96% 28.63% 29.41% 28.63% 8.38% 11.07% 8.38% 7.11% 4.21% 4.51% 3.29% 0.00% 
  
              
AVG 
'00-
'03 39.24% 39.97% 18.32% 18.41% 10.65% 8.66% 16.14% 15.00% 0.00% 0.00% 14.12% 13.29% 1.54% 0.00% 
AVG 
'04-
'07 26.35% 25.69% 24.45% 23.33% 21.27% 21.98% 11.86% 14.20% 3.97% 1.78% 8.60% 7.36% 3.50% 0.00% 
  
              
Time 
trend 
2000-
'03 
vs. 
2004-
'07 (-)*** (+)*** (+)*** (-) (+)*** (-)** (+) 
p-
value 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.211 0.004 0.047 0.219 
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TABLE 5 
 
Correlation matrix 
This table reports the correlations between the various independent variables. The following abbreviations are 
used: LNSALES = the natural logarithm of sales, PTB = the price-to-book value, ROA = the return on assets, 
FIXED = the ratio of fixed to total assets, TAX = the corporate tax rate, CREDITSPR = the credit spread, and 
LEV.LOANSPR = the leveraged loan spread. 
 
 
LN SALES PTB ROA FIXED 
 
TAX 
CREDIT 
SPREAD 
LEV.LOAN 
SPREAD 
 
LN SALES 1       
 
PTB 
 
-0.033 1 
     
ROA 
 
-0.059 0.049 1     
FIXED 
 
-0.027 0.142 -0.211 1    
TAX  
 
-0.150 -0.013 -0.007 -0.016 1   
CREDIT 
SPREAD 
-0.061 0.260 -0.086 0.274 0.285 1  
LEV.LOAN 
SPREAD 
-0.032 0.122 0.027 0.093 0.189 0.405 1 
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TABLE 6 
Descriptive statistics 
This table reports descriptive statistics for the regression variables. Panel A reports the descriptive statistics for 
the dependent variables for both the LBOs and the public peer group. Panel B reports the descriptive statistics for 
the independent variables. The following abbreviations are used: LNSALES = the natural logarithm of sales, 
PTB = the price-to-book value, ROA = the return on assets, FIXED = the ratio of fixed to total assets, TAX = the 
corporate tax rate, CREDITSPR = the credit spread, and LEV.LOANSPR = the leveraged loan spread. 
 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for dependent variables     
  LBOs Public Peers     
  
DEBT / 
EBITDA 
DEBT / 
CAPITAL 
DEBT / 
EBITDA 
DEBT / 
CAPITAL     
 Mean 5.22107 0.70120 1.33255 0.29318     
 Median 5.30000 0.70828 0.65334 0.23760     
 Maximum 9.00000 0.90963 8.78216 0.95650     
 Minimum 2.70000 0.42045 0.00683 0.00190     
  
          
 
Observations 114 74 112 111     
         
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for independent variables 
  LNSALES PTB ROA FIXED TAX CREDITSPR LEV.LOANSPR 
 Mean 6.12436 4.08446 9.55145 28.4092 29.9593 0.80697 2.82580 
 Median 5.80715 2.52000 7.90000 28.4750 30.0000 0.65634 2.82477 
 Maximum 10.8707 102.100 81.6500 80.6000 37.8000 2.02000 3.01222 
 Minimum 2.05027 0.21000 0.08000 0.58667 12.5000 0.54054 2.53540 
  
       
 
Observations 117 117 117 118 118 118 118 
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TABLE 7 
LBO leverage and public peer leverage 
This table reports OLS regressions of LBO leverage on public peer leverage, using different measures: (1) Debt 
to EBITDA, (2) the natural logarithm of Debt to EBITDA and (3) Debt to total capital or total assets for LBOs 
and public peers, respectively. Regression coefficients and relevant statistical measures are reported. T-statistics 
are reported in parentheses. *,** and *** indicate that coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  (1) LBO Debt / EBITDA (2) LBO Ln Debt / EBITDA (3) LBO Debt / Capital 
Public Co. Debt/EBITDA 0.03   
  
[0.50]   
Public Co. Ln Debt/EBITDA  0.00  
  
 [-0.14]  
Public Co. Debt/Assets   -0.05 
  
  [-1.35] 
  
   
Constant 5.17 1.63 0.71 
  
[36.02]*** [69.09]*** [49.11]*** 
 
# Obs. 108 108 70 
R2 0 0 0.01 
F-stat 0.25 0.02 1.83 
Prob(F-stat] 0.62 0.89 0.18 
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TABLE 8 
Regression of public peer leverage on ‘classical’ determinants 
This table reports OLS regressions of public peer leverage, as measured by (1) Debt to EBITDA, (2) the natural 
logarithm of Debt to EBITDA and (3) Debt to total assets, respectively, on the ‘classical’ capital structure 
determinants firm size, collateral, growth potential, corporate tax rate and profitability. Regression coefficients 
and relevant statistical measures are reported. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. *,** and *** indicate that 
coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) Debt / EBITDA (2) Ln (Debt / EBITDA) (3) Debt / Total assets 
Firm size -0.3329*** -0.4178*** 0.0215* 
  
(-4.0971) (-5.4839) (1.6884) 
Collateral 0.0135* 0.0106 0.0041*** 
  
(1.6816) (1.3921) (3.1617) 
Growth potential 0.0088 -0.0238* -0.00267 
  
(0.4669) (-1.7285) (-1.1538) 
Corp. tax rate 0.0292 0.0239 0.0003 
  
(0.7703) (0.6772) (0.0493) 
Profitability -0.0231** -0.0686*** -0.0011 
  
(-2.5637) (-4.3044) (-0.4130) 
Constant 2.5727* 1.5536 0.0546 
  
(1.9160) (1.2172) (0.2558) 
  
   
F-statistic 6.5197 11.5295 2.8280 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0195 
R-squared 0.2369 0.3522 0.1187 
Adj. R-squared 0.2005 0.3217 0.0767 
# Observations 112 112 111 
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TABLE 9 
Regression of LBO leverage on ‘classical’ determinants 
This table reports OLS regressions of LBO leverage, as measured by (1) Debt to EBITDA, (2) the natural 
logarithm of Debt to EBITDA and (3) Debt to total assets respectively, on the ‘classical’ capital structure 
determinants firm size, collateral, growth potential, corporate tax rate and profitability. Regression coefficients 
and relevant statistical measures are reported. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. *,** and *** indicate that 
coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  (1) Debt / EBITDA (2) Ln (Debt / EBITDA) (3) Debt / Total assets 
Firm size -0.0707 -0.0143 0.0006 
  
(-1.1364) (-1.2071) (0.1090) 
Collateral -0.0081 -0.0014 0.0003 
  
(-1.3213) (-1.1645) (0.5916) 
Growth potential -0.0153 -0.0036* 0.0017 
  
(-1.4013) (-1.7227) (0.2309) 
Corp. tax rate -0.0673** -0.0140** -0.0028 
  
(-2.3979) (-2.6198) (-0.9867) 
Profitability -0.0179 -0.0032 -0.0003 
  
(-1.5944) (-1.4869) (-0.2551) 
Constant 8.1232*** 2.2176*** 0.7711*** 
  
(7.9529) (11.401) (7.8765) 
  
   
F-statistic 2.39378 2.7209 0.3242 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.042281 0.0235 0.8967 
R-squared 0.100605 0.1128 0.0236 
Adj. R-squared 0.058577 0.0713 -0.0492 
# Observations 113 113 73 
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TABLE 10 
Regression of public peer leverage on ‘classical determinants’ and debt market liquidity 
This table reports OLS regressions of public peer leverage, as measured by (1) Debt to EBITDA, (2) the natural 
logarithm of Debt to EBITDA and (3) Debt to total assets respectively, on both the ‘classical’ capital structure 
determinants firm size, collateral, growth potential, corporate tax rate and profitability, and the debt market 
liquidity, as measured by credit spread and leveraged loan spread. Regression coefficients and relevant statistical 
measures are reported. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. *,** and *** indicate that coefficients are 
significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  (1) Debt / EBITDA (2) Ln (Debt / EBITDA) (3) Debt / Total assets 
Firm size -0.3560*** -0.3572*** -0.4162*** -0.4172*** 0.0212* 0.0212* 
  
(-4.5246) (-4.4765) (-5.5713) (-5.5944) (1.6801) (1.6871) 
Collateral 0.0072 0.0106 0.0061 0.0092 0.0047*** 0.0044*** 
  
(0.8824) (1.3164) (0.7996) (1.2201) (3.5139) (3.3990) 
Growth potential -0.0273* -0.0218 -0.0319** -0.0281** -0.0017 -0.0022 
  
(-1.8557) (-1.4946) (-2.2820) (-2.0608) (-0.7272) (-0.9501) 
Corp. tax rate -0.0048 0.0114 -0.0015 0.0072 0.0034 0.0024 
  
(-0.1260) (0.3023) (-0.0419) (0.2045) (0.5505) (0.4031) 
Profitability -0.0514*** -0.0525*** -0.0686*** -0.0714*** -0.0011 -0.0007 
  
(-3.123451) (-3.1373) (-4.3858) (-4.5649) (-0.4066) (-0.2581) 
Credit spread 0.8311*  0.9404**  -0.1144  
  
(1.9245)  (2.2929)  (-1.6342)  
Lev. loan spread  0.9748  2.6059**  -0.3299* 
   (0.8306)  (2.3754)  (-1.7293) 
Constant 3.3466** 0.6784 1.6993 -5.2347* 0.0356 0.9118* 
  
(2.5363) (0.2033) (1.3561) (-1.6783) (0.1679) (1.6921) 
  
      
F-statistic 6.8023 6.1286 10.8701 10.9692 2.8393 2.8998 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0134 0.0118 
R-squared 0.2799 0.2594 0.3832 0.3853 0.1407 0.1433 
Adj. R-squared 0.2388 0.2170 0.3479 0.3502 0.0912 0.0939 
# Observations 112 112 112 112 111 111 
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TABLE 11 
Regression of LBO leverage on ‘classical determinants’ and debt market liquidity 
This table reports OLS regressions of LBO leverage, as measured by (1) Debt to EBITDA, (2) the natural 
logarithm of Debt to EBITDA and (3) Debt to total assets, respectively, on both the ‘classical’ capital structure 
determinants firm size, collateral, growth potential, corporate tax rate and profitability, and the debt market 
liquidity, as measured by the credit spread and the leveraged loan spread. Regression coefficients and relevant 
statistical measures are reported. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. *,** and *** indicate that coefficients 
are significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  (1) Debt / EBITDA (2) Ln (Debt / EBITDA) (3) Debt / Total assets 
Firm size -0.0698 -0.0681 -0.0141 -0.0138 0.0007 0.0004 
  
(-1.1185) (-1.1756) (-1.1913) (-1.2521) (0.1362) (0.0765) 
Collateral -0.0073 -0.0054 -0.0012 -0.0008 0.0003 0.0003 
  
(-1.1567) (-0.9433) (-1.0303) (-0.7747) (0.5691) (0.6032) 
Growth potential -0.0140 -0.0103 -0.0033 -0.0026 0.0013 0.0019 
  
(-1.2389) (-1.0101) (-1.5720) (-1.3519) (0.2689) (0.3954) 
Corp. tax rate -0.0633** -0.0456* -0.0134** -0.0098* -0.0029 -0.0032 
  
(-2.1433) (-1.7153) (-2.3818) (-1.9472) (-0.9915) (-1.1044) 
Profitability -0.0180 -0.0157 -0.0031 -0.0027 -0.0003 -0.0004 
  
(-1.5996) (-1.5030) (-1.4894) (-1.3878) (-0.2791) (-0.3650) 
Credit spread -0.1463  -0.0218  0.0176  
  
(-0.4335)  (-0.3389)  (0.2829)  
Lev. loan spread  -3.44823***  -0.6591***  0.0714 
   (-4.1746)  (-4.1932)  (0.8230) 
Constant 8.0935*** 17.077*** 2.2131*** 3.9294*** 0.7592*** 0.5824** 
  
(7.8763) (7.2784) (11.305) (8.7994) (7.0840) (2.3350) 
  
      
F-statistic 2.0110 5.2057 2.2678 5.5495 0.2798 0.3818 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0705 0.0001 0.0424 0.0000 0.9446 0.8881 
R-squared 0.1022 0.2276 0.1138 0.2390 0.0248 0.0335 
Adj. R-squared 0.0514 0.1839 0.0636 0.1960 -0.0639 -0.0543 
# Observations 113 113 113 113 73 73 
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TABLE 12 
Leverage and deal type 
This table reports OLS regressions of LBO leverage, as measured by (1) Debt to EBITDA, (2) the natural 
logarithm of Debt to EBITDA and (3) Debt to total assets, on the ‘classical’ capital structure determinants firm 
size, collateral, growth potential, corporate tax rate and profitability, the debt market liquidity measured by the 
leveraged loan spread, and a dummy for the type of deal (0= primary buyouts, 1= secondary buyouts). 
Regression coefficients and relevant statistical measures are reported. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
*,** and *** indicate that coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
  (1) Debt / EBITDA (2) Ln (Debt / EBITDA) (3) Debt / Total assets 
Firm size -0.0675 -0.0137 0.0003 
  
(-1.1794) (-1.2618) (0.0559) 
Collateral -0.0056 -0.0009 0.0003 
  
(-0.9836) (-0.8206) (0.5839) 
Growth potential -0.0085 -0.0022 0.0020 
  
(-0.8355) (-1.1617) (0.4216) 
Corp. tax rate -0.0384 -0.0083 -0.0033 
  
(-1.4471) (-1.6518) (-1.1168) 
Profitability -0.0146 -0.0025 -0.0004 
  
(-1.4100) (-1.2854) (-0.3749) 
Lev. loan spread -3.4697*** -0.6638*** 0.0727 
  (-4.2540) (-4.2980) (0.8313) 
Dummy=1 0.3905* 0.0841** -0.0067 
  (1.9318) (2.1990) (-0.3433) 
Constant 1.6758*** 3.8605*** 0.5840** 
  
(7.2153) (8.7778) (2.3256) 
  
   
F-statistic 5.1102 5.6196 0.3397 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0001 0.0000 0.9327 
R-squared 0.2541 0.2725 0.0353 
Adj. R-squared 0.2044 0.2240 -0.0686 
# Observations 113 113 73 
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TABLE 13 
Leverage and PE sponsor size 
This table reports OLS regressions of LBO leverage, as measured by (1) Debt to EBITDA, (2) the natural 
logarithm of Debt to EBITDA and (3) Debt to total assets, respectively, on the ‘classical’ capital structure 
determinants firm size, collateral, growth potential, corporate tax rate and profitability, the debt market liquidity 
measured by the leveraged loan spread, and a dummy for the size of the private equity fund involved (0= buyouts 
that are sponsored by private equity players that do not belong in the top-50 of largest private equity funds, 1= 
buyouts that are sponsored by private equity players that do belong in the top-50 of largest private equity funds). 
PE fund size is taken from The Private Equity International ranking for 2007 as published by Private Equity 
International Magazine in its May 2007 Issue. Regression coefficients and relevant statistical measures are 
reported. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. *,** and *** indicate that coefficients are significantly different 
from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
  (1) Debt / EBITDA (2) Ln (Debt / EBITDA) (3) Debt / Total assets 
Firm size -0.0677 -0.0137 0.0005 
  
(-1.1967) (-1.2748) (0.0943) 
Collateral -0.0035 -0.0005 0.0002 
  
(-0.6252) (-0.4554) (0.3545) 
Growth potential -0.0081 -0.0022 0.0021 
  
(-0.8029) (-1.1521) (0.4382) 
Corp. tax rate -0.0471* -0.0101** -0.0030 
  
(-1.8117) (-2.0484) (-1.0335) 
Profitability -0.0136 -0.0024 -0.0004 
  
(-1.3305) (-1.2134) (-0.3886) 
Lev. loan spread -3.8328*** -0.7320*** 0.075086 
  (-4.6659) (-4.6815) (0.8661) 
Dummy=1 0.4870*** 0.0923** -0.0216 
  (2.4785) (2.4673) (-1.1071) 
Constant 1.7862*** 4.0780*** 0.5793** 
  
(7.7219) (9.2609) (2.3266) 
  
   
F-statistic 5.5562 5.8547 0.5034 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.8286 
R-squared 0.2703 0.2807 0.0514 
Adj. R-squared 0.2216 0.2328 -0.0507 
# Observations 113 113 73 
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TABLE APPENDIX 2 
Regression results with dummy lead arranger role 
The table reports OLS regressions of LBO leverage, as measured by (1) Debt to EBITDA, (2) the natural 
logarithm of Debt to EBITDA and (3) Debt to total assets, respectively, on the ‘classical’ capital structure 
determinants firm size, collateral, growth potential, corporate tax rate and profitability, the debt market liquidity 
measured by the leveraged loan spread, and a dummy for the lender role of X (0 = participant lender, 1 = lead 
arranger). Regression coefficients and relevant statistical measures are reported. T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. *,** and *** indicate that coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
  (1) Debt / EBITDA (2) Ln (Debt / EBITDA) (3) Debt / Total assets 
Firm size -0.0717 -0.0701 -0.0147 -0.0144 0.0007 0.0004 
  
(-1.1364) (-1.1979) (-1.2294) (-1.2964) (0.1400) (0.0822) 
Collateral -0.0076 -0.0056 -0.0013 -0.0009 0.0002 0.0003 
  
(-1.1795) (-0.9775) (-1.0850) (-0.8445) (0.5137) (0.5476) 
Growth potential -0.0141 -0.0104 -0.0034 -0.0026 0.0012 0.0018 
  
(-1.2419) (-1.0158) (-1.5804) (-1.3636) (0.2602) (0.3853) 
Corp. tax rate -0.0640** -0.0463* -0.0136** -0.0100* -0.0029 -0.0033 
  
(-2.1484) (-1.7275) (-2.4012) (-1.9751) (-1.0275) (-1.1362) 
Profitability -0.0183 -0.0160 -0.0033 -0.0028 -0.0002 -0.0003 
  
(-1.6126) (-1.5222) (-1.5252) (-1.4315) (-0.2926) (-0.3768) 
Credit spread -0.1462  -0.0217  0.0168  
  
(-0.4311)  (-0.3369)  (0.2701)  
Lev. loan spread  -3.4495***  -0.6596***  0.0703 
  
 (-4.1584)  (-4.1811)  (0.8056) 
Dummy = 1 -0.1065 -0.1149 -0.0340 -0.0356 -0.0203 -0.0197 
  (-0.2669) (-0.3104) (-0.4481) (-0.5062) (-0.4772) (-0.4644) 
Constant 8.1445*** 1.7136*** 2.2294*** 3.9475*** 0.7656*** 0.5909** 
  
(7.7595) (7.2490) (1.1156) (8.7809) (7.0474) (2.3489) 
  
      
F-statistic 1.7187 4.4377 1.9578 4.7599 0.2695 0.3541 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.1123 0.0002 0.0677 0.0001 0.9635 0.9251 
R-squared 0.1028 0.2283 0.1154 0.2408 0.0282 0.0367 
Adj. R-squared 0.0429 0.1768 0.0564 0.1902 -0.0764 -0.0669 
# Observations 113 113 113 113 73 73 
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Appendix 1: Private Equity International Ranking 2007 
This appendix presents the Private Equity International Ranking 2007 as published by Private Equity 
International Magazine in its May 2007 Issue. Firms were ranked by the amount of capital they raised 
for direct private equity investment over the past 5 years. 
     
1 The Carlyle Group                                        $32.5 billion 
2 Kohlberg Kravis Roberts                                 $31.1 billion 
3 Goldman Sachs Principal Investment Area  $31 billion 
4 The Blackstone Group                                    $28.36 billion 
5 TPG                                                      $23.5 billion 
6 Permira                                                 $21.47 billion 
7 Apax Partners                                            $18.85 billion 
8 Bain Capital                                             $17.3 billion 
9 Providence Equity Partners                              $16.36 billion 
10 CVC Capital Partners                                   $15.65 billion 
11 Cinven                                                  $15.07 billion 
12 Apollo Management                                     $13.9 billion 
13 3i Group                                                $13.37 billion 
14 Warburg Pincus                                          $13.3 billion 
15 Terra Firma Capital Partners                           $12.9 billion 
16 Hellman & Friedman                                     $12 billion 
17 CCMP Capital                                            $11.7 billion 
18 General Atlantic                                        $11.4 billion 
19 Silver Lake Partners                                   $11 billion 
20 Teachers' Private Capital                              $10.78 billion 
21 EQT Partners                                            $10.28 billion 
22 First Reserve Corporation                              $10.1 billion 
23 American Capital                                        $9.57 billion 
24 Charterhouse Capital Partners                          $9 billion 
25 Lehman Brothers Private Equity                         $8.5 billion 
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26 Candover                                                $8.29 billion 
27 Fortress Investment Group                              $8.26 billion 
28 Sun Capital Partners                                   $8 billion 
29 BC Partners                                             $7.9 billion 
30 Thomas H. Lee Partners                                 $7.5 billion 
31 Leonard Green & Partners                               $7.15 billion 
32 Madison Dearborn Partners                              $6.5 billion 
33 Onex                                                    $6.3 billion 
34 Cerberus Capital Management                            $6.1 billion 
35 PAI Partners                                            $6.05 billion 
36 Bridgepoint                                             $6.05 billion 
37 Doughty Hanson & Co                                    $5.9 billion 
38 AlpInvest Partners                                      $5.4 billion 
39 TA Associates                                           $5.2 billion 
40 Berkshire Partners                                      $4.8 billion 
41 Pacific Equity Partners                               $4.74 billion 
42 Welsh, Carson, Anderson & Stowe                        $4.7 billion 
43 Advent International                                   $4.6 billion 
44 GTCR Golder Rauner                                     $4.6 billion 
45 Nordic Capital                                          $4.54 billion 
46 Oak Investment Partners                                $4.06 billion 
47 Clayton, Dubilier & Rice                               $4 billion 
48 ABN AMRO Capital                                       $3.93 billion 
49 Oaktree Capital Management                             $3.93 billion 
50 Summit Partners                                         $3.88 billion 
 
 
